NEW POLL: HUNGARIANS UNITED ON NEED FOR A ‘DIFFERENT’ RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU, BUT DIVERGENCES REMAIN ON UKRAINE

• New pre-election poll by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) reveals, despite strained relations between Budapest and Brussels in recent years, Hungarians overwhelmingly “trust” the EU and support their country’s membership of the bloc.

• The survey suggests Hungary’s next government will have a popular mandate to strike a ‘very different approach’ to relations with the EU - with 45% of Fidesz supporters joining 91% of those allied with Tisza in calling for “major” or “minor” changes to the country’s current position.

• Ukraine has emerged as both a dividing line and shared position among voters of the incumbent Fidesz and opposition Tisza parties. While Tisza voters clearly differ from Fidesz supporters in considering Ukraine as chiefly Hungary’s “partner”, rather than as an “adversary”, they share the latter’s’ scepticism about future financial support for Kyiv and Ukraine’s bid to join the EU.

• ECFR experts, Piotr Buras and Pawel Zerka, note that, although a Peter Magyar victory would carry a strong mandate for foreign policy reorientation towards Europe, Hungarians remain divided on the EU’s approach to Ukraine and this should temper expectations about policy U-turns and the prospect of Budapest moving fully back into the European mainstream.

A new Hungarian poll, published yesterday by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), reveals a striking cross-party consensus among Hungarian voters regarding their country’s place and future within the European Union. It finds that despite high-profile friction between leaders in Budapest and Brussels in recent years, 77% of Hungarian voters support their country’s membership of the EU; two-thirds of respondents “trust” the EU; and most want to see their next government strike a “different” approach to EU engagement.

The survey, which was conducted online by Stratega Research and Mandate Research between 26 March and 1 April 2026 on nationally representative sample of 1,001 adult Hungarians, examined public opinion across an array of policy areas including Hungary’s future relationship with the EU; attitudes towards political engagement with China, Russia and the United States; the country’s approach to the conflict in Ukraine; and a series of domestic issues that underpin the current electoral campaign. 

Among its key findings, it shows that most Hungarians want their next government to adopt either a "very different approach" (43%) to Hungary’s position within the EU, or to at least “make minor adjustments to the current approach” (25%); just 19% would like the government to stick to its current approach. This desire for change extends into the heart of the governing party’s base - with 45% of Fidesz supporters joining 91% of opposition Tisza voters in calling for "major" or "minor" changes to the country's current European policy. This is underpinned by widespread support for Hungary’s continued membership of the EU (77% for the overall national population, and shared by 94% and 65% of Tisza and Fidesz supporters, respectively); strong levels of “trust” (75%) in the EU (76% for the overall national population, and shared by 95% and 64% of Tisza and Fidesz supporters, respectively); and even a positive sentiment towards the prospect of Hungary joining the Eurozone (66% for the overall national population, and shared by 89% and 43% of Tisza and Fidesz supporters, respectively).

However, despite a broad, cross-partisan appetite for closer ties with the EU, Hungarian voters continue being heavily split on foreign policy issues, including on the country’s relations with China and the United States. Their attitudes towards Ukraine are also quite complex. Indeed, the collected data shows that, while a majority of Tisza voters (57%) desire a "very different approach" than the current government to the war in Ukraine, they are deeply divided – and, in some cases, many of them share Fidesz supporters’ scepticism - on substantive long-term commitments to Kyiv, including the provision of financial support for Kyiv and support for Ukraine’s bid for EU membership. 

Taken together, this suggests that while Budapest, in the case of Tisza’s victory, should be expected to adopt a more cooperative tone towards Brussels, there are limits to how constructive a foreign policy partner Hungary under the new government could become. 

Key findings from ECFR’s ‘flash poll’ include:

• Hungary's long-standing opposition to EU action on Ukraine has cut-through - with concerns about future funding commitments and Ukraine’s bid to join the EU evident across both Fidesz and Tisza voter groups. ECFR found that while a majority (57%) of Tisza voters would like Hungary to have a “very different approach” to the war in Ukraine than the current government (compared to 72% of Fidesz voters preferring to stick to the current approach), this doesn’t mean that they are radically different from Fidesz voters in their views of specific aspects of policy, vis-a-vis Ukraine. For example, on the subject of providing further financial support to Kyiv, while Fidesz voters overwhelmingly reject this proposition (85%), Tisza voters are split (48% support vs 45% oppose it). The same pattern is evidenced on Ukraine’s bid to join the EU, with 83% of Fidesz-allied voters stating their opposition and Tisza voters split, at 50% supportive vs. 40% opposed. Zelensky is also widely viewed in a negative light, with 84% of Fidesz voters seeing him as a “bad leader” of his country and Tisza voters being split (46% seeing him as a good leader and 42% as a bad one).

• Hungarians are heavily split on foreign policy, especially relationships with China, Russia and the United States. The poll found that, when they are asked about the broader direction that Hungary’s foreign policy should take, Tisza voters overwhelmingly favour closer alignment with European partners (77%), while Fidesz voters are fragmented between balancing the West, Russia and China (25%), aligning with Trump’s United States (24%), closer ties with Europe (16%), and strengthening the ties with Russia and China (14%). Most Tisza voters see Russia as an adversary and Ukraine as a partner; most Fidesz voters take the opposite view on both. Trump and Putin attract mostly positive ratings among Fidesz voters and mostly negative among Tisza voters, with Macron drawing the reverse pattern. On some other policy proposals, 66% of Tisza voters would like Hungary to stop purchasing Russian energy, while 77% of Fidesz voters are opposed. On allowing military aid to transit through Hungary to Ukraine, 62% of Tisza voters are in favour and 77% of Fidesz voters are against.

• Across the political spectrum, there is overwhelming support for maintaining Hungary’s membership of the EU, and strong expressions of “trust” in the European institutions. 94% of Tisza-supporting voters and 65% of Fidesz see merit in Hungary’s membership of the European Union, and comparable levels express trust in the EU (Tisza 95% and Fidesz 64%). Despite strained relations between Hungary and the EU in recent years, only 44% of Fidesz voters would like the country to maintain its current policy positions, vis-a-vis the EU, while 45% would prefer minor or major changes. On the subject of joining the Eurozone, Tisza voters express strong support (89%) for such a move, whereas Fidesz voters are more evenly split, with 46% opposed and 43% in support. 

• Despite a growing appetite to recalibrate Hungary’s relationship with the EU, domestic issues are the primary driver of voter decision-making at this election. Based on an open question, in which respondent were asked to explain the main reason behind their voting choice, ECFR’s poll found that, for Tisza voters, the chief vote-driver is a desire for a change (40%), followed by opposition to the current government (32%) and the importance of accountability and the fight against corruption (20%). For supporters allied with Fidesz, it is mostly about the need to ensure peace and security (27%), followed by trust and reliability towards the current government (16%) and the importance of specific policies and benefits (15%). Separately, when they are asked to choose one issue from a list – one that they consider the most important facing Hungary at this moment – voters of Tisza point to corruption and governance (31%), public services (18%) and the cost of living and inflation (17%), while Fidesz voters selected energy security (22%), and cost of living and inflation (20%). Relatively few people – 6% across the entire national public (and 10% and 2% for Tisza and Fidesz voters, respectively) - said that “relations with the EU” constitute the single most important issue facing Hungary at this moment. There is still plenty to play for ahead of Sunday’s vote - with 1 in 5 voters still undecided. 19% of respondents to ECFR’s survey said they had not yet decided how to vote, including 12% of those who otherwise said they would definitely turn out. 

Commenting on the survey results, Pawel Zerka, senior policy fellow and polling lead at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said:

“Despite Viktor Orbán’s protracted criticism of the European Union, our new survey reveals that two-thirds of Hungarians “trust” the EU and overwhelmingly support maintaining their country’s membership of the bloc. There is also strong cross-party support for a recalibration of Hungary’s relationship with the EU - with most voters of Péter Magyar’s Tisza party and surprisingly many supporters of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz expressing support for a different approach to Hungary’s position within the EU in the coming period.” 

Piotr Buras, senior policy fellow and head of ECFR’s Warsaw office, added:

“Hungary’s European partners should not expect a complete U-turn on foreign policy matters in the event of a Magyar victory. Indeed, on the subject of Ukraine, there is division and scepticism among Tisza and Fidesz voter blocs about the merits of future financial packages for Kyiv and approving Ukraine’s bid to join the European Union. This suggests that Budapest won’t become easily aligned with all the aspects of EU foreign policy, irrespective of Sunday’s result.”