As Europe grapples with the most significant threat to its security architecture since World War II, the question of how quickly the European Union can act has become existential. European Council President António Costa is actively exploring ways to overcome Hungary's continued resistance to Ukraine's bid for European Union membership, with discussions ahead of recent summits focused on potential reforms to the bloc's unanimous decision-making process for admitting new members. Just days ago, 55 Members of the European Parliament from 19 EU countries urged Costa to immediately advance Moldova's EU accession talks, underscoring the urgency with which many view the expansion eastward.

Yet this push for speed and flexibility - however well-intentioned - threatens to unravel carefully constructed bilateral agreements that have shaped EU enlargement for decades. For Bulgaria, the stakes could not be higher. The EU is moving toward abandoning unanimity in foreign policy decisions, with leaders of several member states now studying legal options to replace the unanimity rule with qualified majority voting, primarily in response to Hungary's repeated vetoes on measures tied to Ukraine.

The irony is sharp: Sofia finds itself caught between its genuine desire to support Ukraine's European integration and its determination to secure historical recognition from North Macedonia - a recognition that hinges entirely on its ability to maintain a veto. If the EU establishes that geopolitical urgency justifies circumventing unanimity for Ukraine and Moldova, what prevents the same logic from being applied to North Macedonia, especially when the EU's credibility in the Western Balkans is equally at stake?

The Core of the Bulgaria-North Macedonia Dispute

The Bulgaria-North Macedonia conflict represents one of the most complex bilateral disputes blocking EU enlargement. Bulgaria refuses to recognize the existence of a separate ethnic Macedonian nation and a separate Macedonian language, arguing that ethnic Macedonians are a subgroup of the Bulgarian nation, and that the Macedonian language is a Bulgarian dialect. This fundamental disagreement over identity, language, and historical interpretation has become the central obstacle to North Macedonia's EU accession, despite the country having been a candidate since 2005.

The French Proposal and Its Controversial Implementation

In June 2022, Bulgaria temporarily lifted its veto through the so-called "French proposal." On 24 June 2022, Bulgaria's parliament approved lifting the country's veto on opening EU accession talks with North Macedonia, and on 16 July 2022, the Assembly of North Macedonia also approved the revised French proposal, allowing accession negotiations to begin. However, this compromise has proven deeply controversial and set what many consider a dangerous precedent.

The French proposal set a concerning precedent by allowing the accession process to include Bulgaria's bilateral demands in the Council conclusions, with the EU acting as guarantor of their implementation. This effectively transformed bilateral issues - traditionally handled separately from the accession process - into formal EU criteria, raising questions about whether the EU should serve as an arbiter of historical and identity disputes between member states and candidates.

The Constitutional Deadlock

The crux of the current impasse is the requirement for North Macedonia to amend its constitution to include Bulgarians as a state-forming people. Bulgaria's Minister of Foreign Affairs Georg Georgiev has said the inclusion of the Bulgarians to the Constitution of North Macedonia is the first but not the only condition for the beginning of the country's negotiations for membership in the European Union.

However, North Macedonia's current government has taken a hardline stance. North Macedonia's Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski made it clear that constitutional changes to include Bulgarians won't happen without tangible progress from Bulgaria, stating "We cannot keep changing the Constitution repeatedly without a clear message and results from the Bulgarian side." Mickoski has firmly declared that no constitutional amendments to include Bulgarians in the country's Constitution will be made as long as he holds his current position.

Recent Escalations and EU Parliamentary Tensions

The dispute has recently intensified in the European Parliament. The removal of the terms 'Macedonian identity' and 'Macedonian language' from the European Parliament's progress report on North Macedonia has reheated a conflict the EU tried to cool down. Bulgarian MEPs have successfully delayed votes on North Macedonia's EU accession report, with the European People's Party withdrawing support at the last minute.

Bulgaria's Diplomatic Position on Unanimity

Given this context, Bulgaria's stance on the unanimity requirement becomes strategically critical. Bulgarian Foreign Minister Georg Georgiev has emphasized that adherence to unanimity is key to preserving the integrity of the enlargement decision-making process. This position is not merely procedural - it's existential for Bulgarian interests.

If the EU establishes a precedent of bypassing unanimity for Ukraine and Moldova due to geopolitical urgency, Bulgaria fears that similar logic could be applied to North Macedonia. The EU could argue that prolonged delays harm the Union's credibility in the Western Balkans, potentially circumventing Bulgaria's leverage to ensure its conditions are met.

The Parallel with Ukraine and Moldova

The central dilemma is whether the cases are comparable. The text argues that, unlike Ukraine and Moldova, North Macedonia "does not meet all the criteria for starting negotiations" because it hasn't fulfilled the constitutional amendment requirement. However, this distinction may prove fragile if the EU decides that geopolitical considerations in the Western Balkans - particularly concerns about Russian and Chinese influence - outweigh strict adherence to all bilateral conditions.

The Broader EU Enlargement Context

Bulgaria's blockade of North Macedonia's EU path is likely to stay in place despite both countries having recently elected governments that could bring fresh impetus for a solution. This suggests that the dispute has become deeply institutionalized and resistant to political changes in either capital.

North Macedonia's frustration is palpable, having already made extraordinary concessions to Greece through the Prespa Agreement, which resolved the decades-long name dispute by changing the country's constitutional name to "Republic of North Macedonia." The country now finds itself facing additional bilateral demands that many in Skopje view as attempts to rewrite their national identity and history.

Strategic Implications for Bulgaria and the Path Forward

Bulgaria faces a delicate balancing act that cuts to the heart of what EU membership means for smaller member states. On one hand, Sofia cannot afford to be perceived as obstructing Ukraine's integration at a moment of existential crisis for European security - doing so would isolate Bulgaria diplomatically and undermine its standing as a reliable EU partner. On the other hand, accepting any precedent that weakens unanimity could fatally undermine its ability to secure what it views as historically justified recognition of Bulgarian heritage in North Macedonia.

So what should Bulgaria do? The pragmatic answer - support Ukraine and Moldova's accession path while demanding ironclad commitments that this exceptional procedure remains strictly limited and cannot be invoked for North Macedonia - sounds reasonable in theory but crumbles under scrutiny. The enforceability of such commitments is inherently suspect. Precedents, once set in EU practice, acquire their own gravitational pull and rarely respect the narrow boundaries their creators intend. The very arguments used to justify circumventing unanimity for Ukraine - geopolitical urgency, credibility with candidate countries, preventing Russian influence - can be repackaged and reapplied to the Western Balkans whenever Brussels decides the political cost of delay has become too high.

This places Bulgaria in an unenviable position with no clear winning move. Oppose reforms to unanimity, and Sofia risks being branded as obstructionist at Europe's darkest hour, standing alongside Viktor Orban in blocking aid to a country fighting for its survival. Support the reforms, and Bulgaria gambles away its most powerful leverage in the North Macedonia dispute, trusting that diplomatic assurances will somehow prove more durable than the geopolitical pressures that created this dilemma in the first place.

Perhaps the deeper question is whether Bulgaria's strategy of using EU accession as leverage for bilateral historical disputes was ever sustainable in the long term. The French proposal of 2022 already demonstrated that the EU is willing to entangle bilateral issues with the accession process when geopolitical stakes are high enough. The current push to reform unanimity suggests that Brussels is losing patience with the veto as a tool for resolving identity and historical conflicts.

Ultimately, Bulgaria may need to accept an uncomfortable reality: in a Union increasingly driven by crisis management and geopolitical competition, the power of small member states to indefinitely block decisions - however justified they believe their positions to be - is becoming a luxury the EU can no longer afford. The question is not whether unanimity will be reformed, but whether Bulgaria can extract meaningful concessions during that inevitable transition.